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THE GRAYING OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW:
PATHS TAKEN AND UNTAKEN IN
THE NEW RESTATEMENT
DAVID G. OWEN*
With the approval in principle of the first portion of the new products
liability Restatement' in 1994, the American Law Institute effectively
repealed section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.' In its place,
an entire new Restatement dedicated solely to the topic of products liability
is in the process of being formulated. While the products liability
Restatement project is scheduled to be in progress for several years, the
central and most important provisions-defining the basis of manufacturer
liability and affirmative defenses based on user misconduct-are set forth
in Tentative Draft No. 1.
The centerpiece of this first tentative draft and the whole new
Restatement is Topic 1, "Product Defectiveness,"3 which delineates the
basic definitions of liability. The first two sections within this topic
concern the basic principles of liability, grounded in the concept of
defectiveness, that apply to products generally. Defenses based upon the
plaintiffs conduct are treated generally in section 7 of Topic 3, "Affirma-
* Byrnes Research Scholar and Professor of Tort Law, University of South
Carolina. B.S. (Wharton), 1967; J.D., 1971, University of Pennsylvania. Member, ALI
Consultative Group for the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. Concerned that
Pat Hubbard might not understand the piece, I asked instead for comments on a draft from
Jerry Phillips, who claims to have read and understood it, and who presumably agrees with
all of it. Any mistakes are his.
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1994) [hereinafter Tentative Draft]. The Reporters are James A. Henderson Jr. and Aaron
D. Twerski. Until the products liability Restatement project is completed sometime in the
late 1990s, the numbering of topics and sections and the precise formulation of the language,
especially in the Comments and Reporters' Notes, are subject to change as a result of an
ongoing process of refinement. Unless otherwise noted, all references are to the black letter
and comments in Tentative Draft No. 1. References to § 402A are to the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS (1964).
2. Floor debate was heated and extensive, and time ran out before all issues could
be debated and an adoption vote taken. Consequently, President Charles Alan Wright asked
the ALI membership only for a "sense of the House" vote on whether the general approach
taken in Tentative Draft No. 1 was acceptable. On May 19, 1994, the membership voted to
approve the broad structure and general approach of Tentative Draft No. 1. A vote on
"final" approval was postponed to the next meeting in May 1995, at which time Tentative
Draft No. 2 will be before the Institute.
3. Tentative Draft, supra note 1, §§ 1-4, at 1-105.
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tive Defenses."4  Topic 2, "Causation," links the two responsibility-based
topics together and thereby completes the basic doctrine applicable to
ordinary products liability cases.'
This essay examines certain basic choices made (including alternative
approaches that were rejected) in setting the fundamental rules of liability
in sections 1 and 2 as well as the basic misconduct affirmative defense in
section 7 of the new Restatement on products liability.6  First to be
considered are the central issues of liability, the formulations of the liability
standards that apply to all types of products. Rather than attempting to
define liability in global terms, as did section 402A of the Restatement
(Second), the new Restatement isolates and particularizes the issues
according to the particular type of product defect.7 Consumer expecta-
tions' and negligence9 are rejected as overarching tests of liability, and the
new Restatement further shuns the classification of entire categories of
products as defective in design.' ° The limitations on defectiveness that
help define its borders-the doctrines that concern obvious dangers, product
misuse, and state of the art-are defined cautiously toward middle ground,
away from extremes on either side." Finally, the new Restatement takes
a middle-ground, damages apportionment position on defenses based on
consumer misconduct. 2 All in all, the new Restatement has staked out
positions on the important issues of products liability doctrine near the
center of where the courts and legislatures have traveled over the last three
decades.
If one were to characterize modem products liability law as having a
color, the color would be gray. The grayness of the modem law is captured
well in the new Restatement. From the birth of products liability law in the
early 1960s, through the 1970s and even into the 1980s, the courts in
products liability cases experimented with black-and-white approaches to a
wide range of doctrinal problems in ways that were extreme. 3 During this
developmental period, as the law in this area was searching for its identity
4. Id. §§ 7-8, at 143-57.
5. Id. §§ 5-6, at 105-43.
6. For a closer look at certain aspects of §§ 1 and 2, see David G. Owen,
Defectiveness Redefined: Restating "Strict" Products Liability in Tort (forthcoming 1995)
[hereinafter Defectiveness Redefined].
7. See infra Part I(A).
8. See infra Part I(B)(1).
9. See infra Part I(B)(2).
10. See infra Part I(B)(3).
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part Ill.
13. For examples of such approaches across the range of products liability issues, see
generally W. PAGE KEETON, DAVID G. OWEN, JOHN E. MONTGOMERY & MICHAEL D.
GREEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY-CASES AND MATERIALS 158-81 (2d ed. 1989)
[hereinafter PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY].
1242 [Vol. 61:1241
GRAYING OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
and proper boundaries and was experiencing its initial growth, courts and
legislatures tried out global all-or-nothing approaches on numerous issues
of products liability law. In recent years, however, the law in this area has
been evolving more toward middle ground and compromise, away from the
starker approaches of its youth.
The evolution of products liability law, mirrored in the new Restate-
ment, thus may be viewed as a progression from the blacks and whites of
early years to a modem blend of boring grays--"reasonable," perhaps, from
a variety of perspectives, but devoid of the lively clash of claims of right
and wrong that marked the early years. In this essay's journey along
certain paths of products liability law taken and others that were left untrod,
principle will be seen to have been sacrificed in one doctrinal area after
another in exchange for balance, efficiency, convenience, and expediency.
This journey toward the center may well mark the maturation of the law of
products liability, but one might question at the start whether this graying
of products liability law is entirely for the good.
I. THE LIABILITY TESTS
A. The Chosen Path: Particularizing Doctrine by Type of Defect
When Dean William Prosser crafted section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts in the early 1960s, products liability law was in its
infancy. At this very early stage in the development of the law, the defect
concept was only roughly understood and was conceived of quite naively as
a unitary concept; products were either too dangerous, i.e., "defective," or
safe enough, i.e., "nondefective." As courts in the 1960s and 1970s applied
the principles of section 402A to an ever-widening array of products in an
ever-widening range of contexts, the disparities among the various forms of
product dangers increasingly revealed themselves.
Today, most courts and commentators accept as axiomatic the
fundamental distinctions between three very different forms of product
defect: (1) manufacturing flaws, (2) design inadequacies, and (3) insufficient
warnings of danger and instructions on safe use. In the thirty years since
the ALl adopted section 402A, the need for developing separate doctrinal
approaches to the problems in these three very different contexts has
become a well-accepted premise of products liability law.
Accordingly, in sections 1 and 2 and the comments, 4 the new Restate-
14. This form of segregation by type of defect continues in § 3, which isolates
manufacturing defects for application of the "malfunction doctrine" form of proof (in
Tentative Draft No. 1, but subsequently altered, as discussed below), and in § 4, which
separately defines the various duties of various sellers of prescription drugs and medical
devices by type of defect. Containing a large amount of products liability subdoctrine, the
comments and Reporters' notes likewise separately define and explain many of the most
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ment distinguishes the three types of defect from the very start by defining
each separately. Section 1 of the products liability Restatement sets the
stage by first establishing a uniform touchstone of liability for selling
"defective" products, but then splintering the notion into the three separate
forms of defect:
§ 1. Commercial Seller's Liability for Harm Caused by Defective
Products
(a) One engaged in the business of selling products who sells a defective
product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused
by the product defect.
(b) A product is defective if, at the time of sale, it contains a manufactur-
ing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inade-
quate instructions or warnings. 5
Section 1(a) thus sets forth the basic rule which purports to impose "strict"
liability on sellers for harm from defective products, while section 1(b)
proceeds to trifurcate defectiveness into three entirely separate concepts.
The disaggregation of the defect notion in section 1(b) provides the
basis for the black letter definitions of the standards of liability in section
2:
§ 2. Categories of Product Defects
For purposes of determining liability under § 1:
(a) A product contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs
from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised
in the preparation and marketing of the product;
(b) A product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced by the adoption of a
reasonable alternative design by the seller or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution and the omission of the alternative
design renders the product not reasonably safe;
(c) A product is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings
by the seller or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution
and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product
not reasonably safe. 6
important products liability rules separately for each of the three different types of defect.
15. Tentative Draft, supra note 1, § 1, at 1.
16. Id. § 2, at 9.
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The primary reason for splintering defectiveness in section 1 is thus to
provide separate vessels for distinct liability standards to be defined in
section 2; liability is defined in terms that are truly "strict" for manufac-
turing defects in section 2(a), whereas liability is defined largely in terms of
negligence principles in sections 2(b) and (c) and the comments, albeit
cloaked in the strict-sounding language of "defectiveness."' 7 In a nutshell,
sections 1 and 2 of the new Restatement define liability as strict for
manufacturing defects, but base liability for design and warnings defects in
negligence. "
The test for manufacturing defects in section 2(a) turns on whether the
product unit that caused the injury deviated from the manufacturer's design
specifications-the long-accepted definition of this type of defect. Few
would question the fact that this liability test is "strict," and few would
question the propriety of a truly strict standard of liability in this context. 9
On the other hand, many would question the proposed abandonment of
section 402A's strict liability concept in both design and warnings cases in
exchange for a test of liability explicitly based on principles of negli-
gence. 2° Nonetheless, just such an exchange is precisely what many
17. The reasoning behind this move is explained in id. § 1 cmt. a, at 1-4. See
generally Defectiveness Redefined, supra note 6.
18. Comment a to § 2 provides in part: "The rules set forth in this Section establish
separate standards of liability for manufacturing defects, design defects, and defects based
on inadequate instructions or warnings." Tentative Draft, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. a, at 10.
Comment b makes clear that § 2(a) "calls for.strict liability without fault," id. § 2(a), at 14,
and cmt. a describes the negligence approach used for design and warnings defects:
"Subsections (b) and (c), which impose liability for products that are defectively designed
or sold without adequate warnings or instructions and are thus not reasonably safe, achieve
the same general objectives as does liability predicated on negligence." Id. § 2 cmt. a, at 12.
19. Several good reasons for applying true strict liability in this context are
summarized in id. § 2 cmt. a, at 10. The reasons in moral theory are developed in David G.
Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427, 467-68, 473-74 (1993) [hereinafter Moral Foundations).
20. For example, consider the remarks of Professor Howard Klemme, who has
labored long and productively in the mines of products liability law and theory: "I very
much regret that the Reporters, apparently as well as a majority of the Advisers and the
Council, have decided not to follow the dominant case law on the subject, but to follow their
own instrumentalist views and reintroduce into modem products liability law nineteenth-
century concepts of fault in the form of negligence [in §2(b) and (c)]." Comments on
Tentative Draft No. I to the Reporters by Howard C. Klemme, submitted May 1994, at 1.
[Editor's Note: The edited version of Professor Klemme's comments appears in this volume
as Comments to the Reporters and Selected Members of the Consultative Group, Restatement
of Torts (Third): Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1173 (1994).] Professor Klemrne
concludes that the research and analysis of Tentative Draft No. I fails to provide adequate
or reliable support for the approach taken in that draft. Id. at 2. Because certain of
Professor Klemme's conclusions on both motivation and result appear to me unfairly harsh,
I should note my disagreement with them here.
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(probably most) courts have been doing in substance for many years.
While generally not admitting the essence of their rulings in so many
words, most courts in most contexts have been grounding the defectiveness
determination in both design and warnings cases on risk-utility principles of
balance, reasonableness, and foreseeability. Except in certain limited
instances, the courts have rejected efforts to make manufacturers the
guarantors of product safety, requiring only that manufacturers (1) make
their products as safe as they reasonably are able to do, and (2) warn of
foreseeably material risks through methods that are reasonably available and
reasonably likely to be effective." This is negligence pure and simple, in
fact if not in name. The new Restatement defines both design and warnings
defects, strict in name, according to these principles of the law of
negligence.22 This is the approach that most courts have been following
for some time, of calling a pig a mule.23
B. Paths Untaken: Rejecting Global Approaches
By rejecting section 402A's approach of defining defectiveness in a
single way for all three types of defect, the products liability Restatement
obviated the need for a global test of liability based on some traditional
liability touchstone such as consumer expectations or negligence. Another
form of global defectiveness rejected in the new Restatement is "product
category defectiveness." Such liability is based on the design defectiveness
of entire types of product, such as alcoholic beverages or trampolines,
which contain substantial inherent dangers that cannot be designed away.
Much in principle is sacrificed at the altar of expediency by the new
Restatement's abandonment of consumer expectations and negligence as
formal tests of liability, and in its almost complete rejection of the idea of
product category defectiveness. Nevertheless, the practical advantages of
switching to functional standards of liability, on the one hand, and the
avoidance of major areas of contentious litigation over politically charged
issues, on the other, help explain (yet only very partially to justify) these
choices made in the new Restatement.
21. Of course, manufacturers have an additional duty not to misrepresent the safety
of their products. As with the duty to sell products free from manufacturing defects, the
duty to sell products free from safety misrepresentations is properly truly strict as well. See
Moral Foundations, supra note 19, at 462-65.
22. See Tentative Draft, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. a, at 10.
23. See David G. Owen, Musings on Modern Products Liability Law: A Foreword,
17 SETON HALL L. REv. 505, 511 (1987) (noting the "confusion and embarrassment of
calling a pig a mule"). The propriety of the "calling-a-pig-a-mule" method of defining
defectiveness is also explored in Defectiveness Redefined, supra note 6.
1246 [Vol. 61:1241
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1. Consumer Expectations as the Liability Test
The very definition of defectiveness in section 402A was explicitly
rooted in consumer expectations. In both its halves, the section's core
language of "defective condition unreasonably dangerous ' 2 4 was defined
in the comments in consumer contemplation terms," reflecting the
section's heritage in the law of warranty.26 The fundamental expectational
value rests on the central importance of truth to individuals attempting to
make intelligent choices in exercising their free wills. 27  Protecting
expectations is thus a vitally important function of the law.
As a general and independent "test" of liability, however, the consumer
expectations standard has not served well in providing compensation to
consumers for unexpected accidents. Instead, manufacturers have often
used the test as a deadly sword against consumers to bar recovery in cases
involving obvious dangers or where a consumer's expectations were
necessarily undeveloped or cynically realistic. It is difficult to define the
relevant expectations of bystanders put at risk, and courts have generally
been forced to rely on the expectations of employers, parents, and doctors
whose expectations and interests are often quite different from those of the
persons in their charge.28
Truth and consumer expectations lie at the heart of the representational
duties of manufacturers, and they underlie the duty to provide adequate
warnings and instructions.29  Consumer contemplations also play a
significant role in proper design decision-making, but the new Restatement
is probably correct in defining the liability standards "functionally" instead,
by type of defect. In defining design defectiveness, the new Restatement
includes consumer expectations as a factor to be considered in balancing a
variety of mostly risk-utility factors.3" Under section 2(b), courts may thus
continue to view consumer expectations as a particularly important
factor-that sometimes will be controlling-in rendering design defective-
ness determinations. By planting the consumer expectations tree in a design
defectiveness forest comprised mostly of risk-utility vegetation, the new
Restatement provides necessary shelter to victims of accidents resulting
from obvious product risks that, cheaply and feasibly, could and should
have been designed away.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964).
25. See id. crts. g (defective condition) & i (unreasonably dangerous).
26. See David A. Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L.
REV. 339, 348 (1974).
27. See generally Moral Foundations, supra note 19, at 439-41.
28. See Tentative Draft, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. e, at 23, and § 2, Reporters' Note to
§ 2 cmt. c; see generally PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY, supra note 13, at 190-210.
29. See generally Moral Foundations, supra note 19, at 462-68.
30. See Tentative Draft, supra note 1, § 2 cmts. c, d, and e, at 15, 19, 23.
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Safety expectations of product users may thus effectively be taken into
account by redirecting the doctrinal inquiry away from the consumer's
perceptions toward the kinds of specific shortcomings in the product that
could and should have been corrected by the manufacturer. Such a direct
focus on the product, with the resultant indirect focus on the manufacturer
provides (1) a more balanced and workable standard for courts and juries
attempting to apply the liability test in specific cases, (2) a more compre-
hensible guide for manufacturers, and (3) more effective protection for
victims of certain types of product accidents. Ironically, consumer
expectations may thus be best protected by first abandoning them as a
general and independent "test" of liability and then incorporating them into
liability standards tailored to the defect categories.
While the consumer expectations test may work poorly as a general test
of liability for defectiveness, there are special contexts where the test should
probably be retained. One such situation involves the presence of "natural"
dangers in certain kinds of food, such as a fish bone or shell in seafood
chowder. Here, the new Restatement explicitly retains the consumer
expectations test, rejecting the largely discredited "foreign/natural"
distinction formerly employed by many courts.3' Another situation may
be the "product malfunction" type of case in which a product suddenly and
catastrophically fails, destroying all evidence of defectiveness-a new
automobile's steering or brakes suddenly fail to work, causing the car to
crash into a tree; Christmas tree lights inexplicably catch fire, causing them
to be consumed; or a person is suddenly and severely sickened while eating
food, but all evidence of contamination disappears in the victim's stomach
and thence elsewhere. Despite the absence of direct evidence of product
defectiveness is such cases, it is sometimes clear as a matter of circumstan-
tial evidence that such a malfunctioning product was quite probably
defective in one way or another. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur often is
unable to help in such cases for the simple reason that proof of defective-
ness generally falls far short of establishing the supplier's negligence. This
is where the consumer expectations test may come to the rescue, in a kind
of default capacity, by placing liability on the suppliers of malfunctioning
products that probably were defective. Liability thus may be grounded in
the frustration of the user's safety expectations rather than in impossible
proof of the specific mechanisms that first caused the product to fail and
then destroyed all evidence of causation.
Section 3 of the new Restatement adopts a helpful "malfunction" basis
of liability, a form of defect ipsa loquitur, for situations in which a product
unexpectedly malfunctions.32 By its very terms, however, the malfunction
rule as formulated in Tentative Draft No. 1 was limited to cases involving
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Council Draft No.
2, 1994) § 2 cmt. f thereinafter Council Draft No. 2].
32. See Tentative Draft, supra note 1, § 3, at 80.
1248 [Vol. 61:1241
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manufacturing defects.33 Yet some malfunction cases, albeit less frequent
ones, involve defects in design ani so lie outside the protection of the rule
as formulated in the earlier version of section 3. No doubt, proof of design
defectiveness may often be available in such cases from an examination of
similar units of the product.34 Yet sometimes the precise mechanisms that
caused a particular product to fail are not readily discoverable by examining
or even testing similar products that have not yet failed. Moreover, the cost
of expert testing and proof in such instances may put all but the most
serious cases of this sort outside the practical realm of the justice system.
There thus appears to be no good reason to attempt to undercut the ability
of accident victims to obtain relief in cases involving probable design
defects-or, more commonly perhaps, in cases involving the probability of
some kind defect, but only speculation as to the particular form of defect.
Finally persuaded by the logic and fairness of arguments such as
these,35 the Reporters have broadened the malfunction principle in section
3 to include cases that involve the probability of any form of defect.
Section 3 now provides as follows:
§ 3. Circumstantial Evidence Supporting Inference of Product Defect
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by
a product defect, without proof of the specific nature of the defect, when:
(a) the incident resulting in harm was of a kind that ordinarily would
occur only as a result of product defect; and
(b) evidence in the particular case supports the conclusion that more
probably than not:
(1) the cause of the harm was a product defect rather than other
possible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third
persons; and
(2) the product defect existed at the time of sale or distribution.36
33. As it appeared in Tentative Draft No. 1, § 3 provided as follows:
When a product fails to function as a reasonable person would expect it to function,
and causes harm under circumstances where it is more probable than not that the
malfunction was caused by a manufacturing defect, the trier of fact may infer that such
a defect caused the malfunction and plaintiff need not specify the nature of the defect.
Id.
34. Id. cmt. b, at 82-83.
35. Advanced by Bill Wagner, Richard Wright, and myself, among others.
36. This is how the Reporters have formulated § 3 as this essay goes to press in
January 1995, and as they presently contemplate including it in Tentative Draft No. 2 for
distribution to the ALI membership in April 1995 preparatory to the Institute's annual
meeting in May. See Memo from the Reporters to the ALI Council (October 11, 1994),
with modifications as described and explained to me by Aaron Twerski in various
conversations in late 1994 and early 1995. In the coming months, I shall be seeking to have
(1) the phrase "ordinarily would occur" in § 3(a) converted to something like "probably
would occur" or "is likely to occur," and (2) the phrase "including the conduct of the
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This expansion of the malfunction (circumstantial evidence) section is
a vital improvement in the doctrine of the new Restatement. Manufacturers
thus are to be held strictly accountable, under section 3, for certain product
accidents involving the most severe violations of consumer expectations
which, whether for practical problems of proof or other reasons, otherwise
would be excluded from coverage under the liability definitions of section
2. This broadening of the malfunction principle in section 3 effectively and
properly closes what might well have been the largest liability-restricting
loophole in section 2. One might well also anticipate the possibility that
other untoward liability-restrictive loopholes, as yet unforseen, may lurk
dormantly in section 2's functional definitions of defectiveness. Conse-
quently, prudence suggests that courts should retain a limited, residual role
for the consumer expectations test (or should be prepared to adopt some
functional equivalent thereof) for future use in whatever narrow categories
of cases prove incapable of fair resolution under the section 2 tests of
product defect.
2. Negligence as the Liability Test
While plaintiffs may decry the abandonment of consumer expectations
as the explicit test of liability in the new Restatement, defendants surely
would have wished for a more complete return to negligence as the explicit
test of products liability. For manufacturing flaws, of course, such a return
would not have been appropriate because both law and attitudes have
evolved in this context to the point where the risk of injury from such true
"mistakes" is properly seen to lie upon the manufacturer." In the case of
design and warnings defects, however, much may be said for calling a pig
a pig and defining liability in the terms as well as the principles of the law
of negligence. Yet this kind of explicit recognition of a negligence test of
liability flies squarely in the face of what courts have been saying since
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts first stormed across the
nation now long ago.
Just why have the courts insisted in these cases on calling a pig a mule,
by denoting liability as "strict" while applying the fault-based principles of
the law of negligence? A number of factors in combination help explain
why so many courts, in defining liability for dangers in design and from
inadequate safety information, have distorted reality so much for so long.
The first explanation lies in the way in which section 402A was
formulated. Prior to the current version of section 402A as it finally was
plaintiff and third persons" deleted from § 3(b)(1). Both changes appear to be felicitous
refinements in what otherwise appears to be a sound adaptation of the general res ipsa
loquitur principles of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1964) to the products
liability context.
37. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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adopted by the ALI in 1964, Dean Prosser had, over a period of years, put
the section through several drafts. Increasingly expanding the doctrine's
scope, he was attempting to stay ahead of the liability theory curve that he
then perceived to be in a state of fundamental and rapid flux from
negligence to "strict" accountability for harm from product defects."a
There were only a few relevant cases at that early stage in the law's
development, and they mostly involved manufacturing defects. As alluded
to above, the reasons for imposing true strict liability in manufacturing
defect cases are quite compelling,39 and the central term used to define
strict products liability--"defect"-is immediately comprehensible in the
manufacturing context, and only there. Thus, at the time Dean Prosser
formulated a global rule of "strict" liability in tort for harm caused by
product defects, the focus was squarely on manufacturing defects for which
strict liability seemed eminently appropriate.
Moreover, abroad in the early 1960s were swells of popular interest in
consumer protection and in the harnessing of corporate power. Strict
products liability to the consumer-as first announced in the warranty
context in 1960 by Judge Francis in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.,40 and as then converted to the law of torts in 1963 by Judge Traynor
in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. ,4 ' and in 1964 by Dean Prosser
in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts-seemed a natural
part of the broader populist march toward ultimate freedom of common
men and women striving to take control of their destinies by shaking off the
final yokes of exploitation by big business. Strict products liability in tort
for defective products thus seemed to be an inevitable legal development
within this exciting and historic social movement.42
As the courts began to apply the new "strict" liability doctrine to design
and warnings cases, however, they ran into a rather solid wall. The
consumer expectations test served the strictness function well enough. As
discussed above, however, it contained such inherent difficulties as a "test"
of liability that courts were often bound to search elsewhere for a
meaningful and workable standard to distinguish designs and warnings that
were bad from those that were safe enough. What they found for design
cases, of course, was the risk-benefit (or "risk-utility") standard rendered
famous by Learned Hand in his celebrated B<PL liability formula in the
Carroll Towing case.43  Balancing the risks and benefits of various
38. See generally PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY, supra note 13, at 166-68, 223-
25.
39. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
40. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
41. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
42. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise
of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601, 636-38 (1992).
43. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
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designs, most particularly the design of the accident product as compared to
the alternative design proposed by the plaintiff's experts,' was increasing-
ly perceived as the most workable and rational method for answering in
concrete design cases the perplexing question: How much safety is enough?
In the warnings context, the most significant question turned out to be
whether the foreseeability principles of negligence law should be used to
protect manufacturers from strict liability for failing to warn consumers
about unanticipated risks of harm. After a dramatic turnaround in New
Jersey in the 1980s,45 the foreseeability limitations on liability finally won
the day as applicable to determinations of strict liability for warnings
defects.46
In adopting the B<PL test for design cases, and the foreseeability
limitation for warnings cases, the courts had to confront the conceptual
difficulty and practical embarrassment of reverting to the law of negligence
for the definition of "strict" liability. Quite understandably, the courts did
not rush to admit their error by explicitly repealing their adoption of "strict"
liability for design and warnings cases, for that would have seemed to reject
as well the ideals of the consumer movement which still, in concept,
retained much power. Instead, they simply applied the principles of
negligence law under the umbrella of "strict" liability. In other words, they
called a pig a mule.
Although the courts in this way locked themselves into pig-is-a-mule
liability tests for design and warnings defects, the ALl could have tried to
correct the problem in the new Restatement and redefined the pig as truly
a pig by returning to negligence as the explicit black letter test for liability.
Much would have commended this type of forthright approach, which
would have gone a long way to correct the mistake of the Restatement
(Second) of globally defining defect in consumer expectation terms. Yet
persuasive arguments point as well the other way.
(expressing the risk-benefit concept in algebraic terms, such that negligence is implied if
B<PL, where B is the burden or cost of avoiding accidental loss, P is the increase in
probability of loss if B is not undertaken, and L is the probable magnitude or cost of such
loss).
44. In fact, three separate balances must properly be struck in rendering design
defect decisions. See Defectiveness Redefined, supra note 6.
45. The New Jersey courts took a true strict liability approach in both fact and name
in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982), and then abruptly
changed to the negligence approach under a strict liability umbrella in Feldman v. Lederle
Lab., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992). See generally David
G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REv. 703, 709-16 (1992).
46. The correctness of New Jersey's holding in this respect in the Feldman case, 479
A.2d 374, was certified by the California court in Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470
(Cal. 1988) (prescription drugs), and Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d
549 (Cal. 1991) (asbestos, extending the use of negligence principles in warnings cases to
all products).
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Both society and the law have evolved considerably since 1964. For a
variety of reasons, most other industrial nations have since then switched to
a purportedly "strict" standard of responsibility for product safety.
Moreover, the courts in this nation, having deluded themselves with the pig-
is-a-mule liability standard for three decades, by now have probably really
begun to think of the standard as "strict" in fact as well as name. In other
words, over the years the very meaning of the word "strict" has gradually
shifted in the products liability context to mean something other than its
classical definition of liability without fault. To many courts and lawyers,
"strict" liability for design and warnings dangers has come to mean
something along the lines of liability for product dangers that reasonably
could and should have been designed or warned away. This form of
"strict" liability may do violence to rarefied academic models of tort theory,
as it does somewhat to logic and common language, but the meaning of the
term has evolved according to its twisted real-world application.
This is not to say that courts should abandon considering the possibility
of purifying the law by shifting back to negligence as the explicit standard
of liability in design and warnings cases. Courts, lawyers, jurors, and
manufacturers all would find in such a move a refreshing return to honesty
and common understanding in legal doctrine. Yet to a large extent the law
is what the law says, and the ALI was hardly "wrong" in restating liability
as the courts have come to state it. Consequently, there is no longer a need
even to state the issue starkly in black or white as "strict liability versus
negligence," for the law has moved inward from both extremes toward a
not-too-satisfying but realistic tone of gray.
3. Product Category Defectiveness
Another global approach to a products liability issue rejected by the
new Restatement is the idea that entire categories of products-perhaps
cheap handguns, cigarettes, alcohol, trampolines, above-ground swimming
pools, and three-wheel all-terrain vehicles (ATVs)--may be inherently
defective in design.47 The claim of defectiveness in such cases is based
upon the idea that some such products may contain excessive inherent
danger that cannot be designed or warned away. For example, cheap
handguns may kill too many victims of criminal and family assaults.
Alcohol and cigarettes, addictive to millions of Americans, may cause more
suffering than the perversely addictive "pleasure" they provide. Finally,
above-ground pools, trampolines, and three-wheel ATVs may cause more
injuries than they are worth. Such products thus may be inherently
47. The Reporters had argued earlier against this type of categorical design defect
liability. See James A. Henderson Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products
Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1263
(1991).
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defective in design, and categorically so, because they fail the basic cost-
benefit test: their accident costs exceed the benefits they provide. If the
risk-utility calculations are correct, then such products are on balance
simply bad; they generate for society a net disutility, more harm than value,
more bad than good. This is the concept of product category defectiveness
implicitly rejected in section 2(b)'s requirement that the plaintiff establish
a reasonable alternative design in virtually every case.48
Courts indeed have only infrequently held a product to be defectively
designed in the absence of a reasonable alternative design.49 One may
fairly question the appropriateness of product category-wide liability on
grounds of judicial competency, on whether courts may properly decide for
the public that certain types of products consumers want are simply bad in
law. Put this way, a judicial declaration that a certain product type wanted
by consumers is "illegal" looks somewhat like judicial prohibition and quite
like paternalistic arrogance by the courts. The problem with category
defectiveness, then, is that it authorizes courts and juries to interfere with
consumer freedom of choice on the supposition that a court (or jury) knows
better than consumers what is good for them.5"
It just may be, however, that courts do sometimes know what is better
for consumers than consumers themselves, or at least that they may
48. Product category defectiveness is explicitly rejected in comment c:
The requirement in § 2(b) that plaintiff show a reasonable alternative design applies
even though the plaintiff alleges that the category of product sold by the defendant is
sufficiently dangerous that it should not have been marketed at all. Thus common and
widely distributed products such as alcoholic beverages, tobacco, small firearms, and
above-ground swimming pools may be found to be defective only upon proof of the
requisite conditions in § 2(a), (b), or (c).
Tentative Draft, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. c, at 17-18. In Council Draft No. IA, the Reporters
opened a "toy gun" window for product category defectiveness-allowing liability in the
case of a toy pellet gun that could injure children-which, upon objections by the Council,
the Reporters thereupon closed in Tentative Draft No. 1.
On motion and argument by Robert Habush of Milwaukee, and after vigorous debate, the
Institute voted in May 1994 to amend comment c by readopting the toy gun exception to the
general rule against product category defectiveness. At issue during the spirited debate on
this issue was whether the toy gun exception will be seized upon by courts to expand the
concept beyond its terms. As of late 1994, the Reporters plan to set out the Habush
Amendment separately, as comment d to § 2, in Tentative Draft No. 2. One may hope that
courts are indeed emboldened by this exception and that it will be broadened as warranted
by particular cases.
49. So far, the most celebrated decision along these lines is probably Kelley v. R.G.
Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985) (utility of cheap handguns exceeded by the harm
they cause), which was subsequently overruled by the state legislature. See Tentative Draft,
supra note 1, Reporters' Note to § 2 cmt. c, at 52.
50. A related process problem concerns the difficulty of principled adjudication of
such politicized issues involving broad cost-benefit calculations of values that may be
incommensurable.
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sometimes be better positioned to render fair and rational "legislative" type
decisions on the balance of risks and benefits in certain types of prod-
ucts." Imagine, for example, a case of a father pestered successfully by
his 10-year-old daughter to buy a trampoline for backyard use. Assume
further that the daughter thereafter bounces off the trampoline onto her head
and is paralyzed for life. Before purchasing the trampoline, the father
(unless a public safety epidemiologist for the Consumer Products Safety
Commission) probably would have had no meaningful appreciation of the
product's balance of trade-offs between fun and danger. Even if the
literature accompanying the trampoline fully detailed the numbers, types,
and severity of risks from different types of trampoline use and misuse, the
father, even as so "informed," probably never could have truly understood
the real balance of risks and benefits presented by the trampoline, either to
society in general or to his family in particular. Nor, of course, was the
daughter ever in a position to make any kind of rational cost-benefit
decision for herself.
Although a trial court may serve poorly as a legislature or an agency
for rendering macro-social determinations on the net value of home trampo-
lines, it provides a better forum for an injured claimant than none at all.
After all, courts are the traditional and generally the only forums for
rendering compensation decisions for consumers after accidents have
occurred. While compensation is appropriate only for harm from products
that are "defective," what could be more defective than a product that
causes more harm than good? It is easily forgotten that ruling such a
product as defective does not ban it altogether, but simply taxes to the
manufacturer (and thus indirectly to its shareholders and consumers) the
true extent of the product's accident costs. It may well be that many courts
will want to retain the power to decide that certain high-risk products fairly
should be priced to include their excessive costs: costs that consumers are
unable to comprehend or avoid, costs inevitably and involuntarily inflicted
upon other persons, such as children, passengers in other cars, and the
victims of violent crimes." When a product's excessive risks of harm
cannot fully and effectively be appreciated and thus dealt with rationally by
the persons put at risk, the courts should want to make themselves available
to force the manufacturer to internalize the costs of injuries.
Why should not the price of a pack of cigarettes or a can of beer reflect
the enormous costs of lung cancer and drunk-driving injuries that are very
often borne by innocent third parties and by the public at large through
51. On the inherently "legislative" nature of design decisionmaking, see Moral
Foundations, supra note 19, at 468-84. Compare Professor Henderson's characterizations
of manufacturer design decisions as "polycentric" and "managerial." James A Henderson
Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of
Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973).
52. And so "externalized," in the parlance of economists.
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private and public health care insurance mechanisms? To argue that
consumer freedom or legislative deference precludes the courts from
requiring these costs to be included in the price of certain high-risk products
of dubious utility---especially those that are addictive-seems to miss the
point. If the product in fact is addictive, the issue might be characterized
more fairly not as whether to deprive consumers of their freedom, but as
whether to protect consumers from duress. Moreover, if a legislature or
administrative agency actually makes a full and fair determination that a
particular type of dangerous product is worth the risks, as Congress may
have done with the Swine Flu vaccine in the 1970s" and as the National
Highway & Traffic Safety Administration arguably did with the various
passive restraint alternatives to automotive air bags in the 1980s,"4 then the
judiciary should stay its hand. Unfortunately, however, the legislatures are
institutionally incapable of addressing the vast majority of product safety
problems. Additionally, the various product safety agencies have limited
jurisdictions, limited budgets, and often limited skills and wills to address
in an effective manner the great majority of product risks." On balance,
then, the new Restatement's general rejection of the concept of product
category defectiveness may reflect an unduly conservative point of view on
judicial competency that many courts may choose to reject as an outright
rule.
Finally, while it certainly is true that courts infrequently predicate
liability on the global disutility of a product, courts have long defined
defectiveness in just this global manner, often stating (generally and without
qualification) that products are defective if their risks exceed their benefits.
In applying this conventional cost-benefit definition of defectiveness, surely
the great majority of cases involve products that could have been designed
more safely in a variety of alternative ways. The theory of product
category defectiveness simply is not relevant to such ordinary product cases
in which plaintiffs will quite properly be required to show a reasonable
design alternative. For example, automobiles are involved in the deaths of
some 40,000 persons, and the maiming of millions of others, in this nation
every year. Nonetheless, one would have to search long and hard to find a
judge or jury willing to hold that the costs of automotive accidents exceed
the many benefits to society that cars provide.56 By contrast, the benefits
of cheap handguns, cheap alcohol, cheap cigarettes, and cheap home
trampolines may not on balance fairly be worth their enormous risks. In
53. See generally Nina S. Appel, Liability in Mass Immunization Programs, 1980
B.Y.U. L. REv. 69 (1980).
54. See generally PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY, supra note 13, at 810-15.
55. See generally id. at 1-12.
56. Accordingly, plaintiffs in automotive design cases must appropriately establish
feasible alternative designs. See generally id. at 791-806.
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fact, their low prices" may encourage excessive use. Thus, most courts
may not wish to tie their hands by outlawing product category defectiveness
altogether, but may rather decide to leave this design defectiveness
approach within the arsenal of products liability theories as a useful and
important tool for special use in certain limited types of cases."
II. LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY
So far, the inquiry has focused on defectiveness at its definitional core.
Like all law, there are important limits to the reach of defectiveness which
help to give it proper definition at its borders. The three principal limiting
factors in this regard concern the issues of obvious dangers, product misuse,
and state of the art. 9 Each of these factors, at least theoretically, may
either be accorded a decisive role in liability determinations or, alternative-
ly, folded into a calculus of factors for a broader form of decisionmaking.
As has been true with the basic definitions of liability, the role of these
three liability-limiting issues has evolved from the exuberantly extreme
approaches of the early days of products liability law into a mid-life state
of gray.
When modem products liability law was getting off the ground in the
1960s, the patent danger doctrine ruled the land, product misuse was a
concept that bewildered courts and commentators, and few had thought
about whether the state of the technological art should play a role in the
new doctrine of strict products liability in tort as promulgated in section
402A of the then new Restatement (Second) of Torts.' As the decade of
the 1970s opened its doors, the patent danger doctrine was still entrenched
but beginning to show a little wear, and the courts had begun to experiment
in a variety of ways with the doctrines of both product misuse and state of
the art. As for misuse, many courts were applying it as a broad and
57. Low relative to the harm they cause since, if product category defectiveness is
not allowed, their prices will artificially exclude their arguably excessive accident costs
which are instead externalized to a large extent on other persons.
58. That courts have left themselves an opening for such special types of cases is
noted in the Reporters' Notes to Tentative Draft § 2 cmt. c, at 53: "[lIt is important to note
that a number of courts have suggested in dictum that in rare instances where the product
has low social utility and very high risk that they might be willing to impose liability
without proof of a reasonable alternative design." A court adopting the definitions of
defectiveness in § 2 might do well to leave room for such special cases by treating the
availability of a reasonable alternative design as a presumptive (rather than conclusive)
requirement in § 2(b).
59. See generally PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY, supra note 13, at 360-463;
Defectiveness Redefined, supra note 6.
60. Yet the state of the art issue was anticipated in warnings cases, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1964), and in the prescription drug context, id. cmt. k.
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complete defense, 6' barring liability altogether for any use that was not in
fact "intended" by the manufacturer. Other courts went to the other
extreme, allowing juries to find highly unusual and entirely unreasonable
types of product abuse as "foreseeable" and therefore within the realm of
manufacturer responsibility. In the case of the "state of the art defense" and
"state of the art evidence," courts went every which way. Some held that
manufacturers were protected under section 402A from having to apply
technology in any manner other than how manufacturers generally were
applying it at. the time of manufacture. Other courts defined liability
according to the "Wade-Keeton test," which held manufacturers accountable
for excessive product harm whether or not that harm could have been
foreseen or prevented under scientific or technological techniques knowable
at the time.62
As products liability law matured in the 1970s and 1980s, courts
increasingly abandoned extreme approaches to each of these three limiting
issues and generally moved instead toward middle ground. 63  Eventually
repudiated in almost every jurisdiction, the patent danger doctrine was
broadly replaced during this period with a rule that factored the obviousness
of a product hazard into the broader design calculus of risks and benefits
and into the affirmative defenses based on user fault. Quite properly,
however, the great majority of courts have continued to rule that it is
generally nonsensical to require warnings of dangers that are truly obvious.
What to do with product misuse has remained a problem issue that
continues to haunt some courts, but most quite properly hold manufacturers
accountable for failing to take reasonable steps to guard against harm from
uses (or "misuses") that fairly may be classified as "reasonably foresee-
able." Conversely, most courts protect manufacturers altogether from
liability for harm from misuse that is unforeseeable-on grounds of
nondefectiveness, the absence of proximate cause, or as an affirmative
defense. Finally, the state of the art issue in recent years seems largely to
have faded from judicial debate, probably because of the widespread
acceptance of the appropriateness of negligence principles in design and
warnings cases. Certifying the propriety of such balanced, modem
approaches to the border liability issues in products liability, the new
61. I use the term "defense" loosely and advisedly, since many courts require the
plaintiff to prove the absence of misuse as part of the prima facie case. See generally
PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY, supra note 13, at 390-92 n.4.
62. At least this was the theoretical import of the test. Until Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982), however, the Wade-Keeton test appears
never to have been applied by an appellate court in a manner holding a manufacturer liable
for failing to guard against a risk claimed by the defendant to be unknowable or
technologically unavoidable.
63. The legislatures, caught up in the politics of products liability and general tort
"reform," have not always been so temperate in their approaches to these issues.
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Restatement restates the law on obvious dangers,' product misuse, s and
state of the art66 on comfortable middle ground.
III. DEFENSES BASED ON USER MISCONDUCT
On the other side of a products liability case from defectiveness lies the
matter of the victim's misconduct in using a product improperly-as by
failing to inspect a candy bar for worms, using a power circular saw on an
old two-by-four riddled with nails, sticking one's hand under an operating
power lawn mower, or driving a car into a tree while in a drunken stupor.
Consumer misconduct very probably accounts for more product accidents
than does defectiveness.67
In the early years of modem products liability law, most courts applied
an all-or-nothing approach to defenses of this type-either none of the
defenses applied and the user won the case, collecting all his damages, or
one or more of the misconduct defenses did apply, and the user lost the
case entirely. Comment n to section 402A provided support for the early
all-or-nothing approach, stating that a consumer who negligently fails to
inspect a product for defects, as in the wormy candy bar example, should be
recompensed for all of his losses. On the other side of the misconduct
issue, the comment further stated that a person who knowingly and
unreasonably exposes himself to product risks, as by attempting with his
hand to clear away clumps of grass from an area near the moving blade of
a power lawn mower, should bear the consequences of the misconduct
entirely himself. As the doctrine of comparative fault spread like wildfire
across the meadows during the 1970s and 1980s, most courts began to
replace the all-or-nothing approach to consumer misconduct in products
liability cases, as in other forms of tort litigation, with the principles of
damages apportionment.
The overriding general issue in products liability cases involving
consumer misconduct, then, is whether the harm in such cases should be
allocated decisively and altogether to the manufacturer or to the user, or
whether it should instead be divided between the parties. As with the
defectiveness issues discussed above, many courts and the new Restatement
have rejected the black-and-white approach to consumer misconduct, opting
64. See Tentative Draft, supra note 1, § 2 cmts. c, h, at 15, 27.
65. The comments on misuse are generally to this effect but at some points are quite
muddled. Compare the approaches to the issue in § 2 cmts. c, i, 1, at 15, 28, 33.
66. See Tentative Draft, supra note 1, § I cmt. a, at 1; § 2 cmts. a, c, i, at 10, 15,
28; § 4 cmt. g, at 95.
67. "[O]ver 2/3 of all injuries related to consumer products have nothing to do with
the design or the performance of the product. They relate to the misuse or abuse of the
product." Mary Fisk, An Interview with John Byington, TRIAL, Feb. 1978, at 25. Byington
was at the time chairman of the Consumer Product Safety Commission.
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instead for the "gray" approach of comparative fault in allowing liability but
dividing damages. Yet the issue here is not quite so clear and simple as it
might at first appear, and lurking within the broader issue are a variety of
natty problems that confront the courts.
The first such problem concerns the division of authority between the
courts and legislatures and hence the underlying power of a court to apply
rules of consumer misconduct as the court sees fit. Although different
legislatures have enacted various types of products liability reform statutes
treating defectiveness issues in a variety of ways, there has probably been
no area of legislative reform affecting products liability law so widely as
the general tort legislation on comparative fault. In addressing consumer
misconduct issues of the types described above, therefore, courts first need
to apply faithfully the language of applicable comparative fault statutes.
Determining whether a legislature intended to include "strict" products
liability, assumption of risk, or product misuse within the ambit of a statute
that speaks only of allocating "fault" or "negligence" between the parties
involves important preliminary issues of legislative interpretation. The
difficulty of the question of whether such a statute applies to "strict"
products liability is now compounded by the new Restatement's express
assertion that design and warnings defectiveness are both based on
principles of negligence. There is no evident right or wrong approach to
such interpretive problems. All that can be asked of courts in such cases is
that they fairly attempt to apply the proper rules of legislative interpreta-
tion-not by any means an easy task, but not really a special problem of
products liability theory.
Once a court decides that it has the power to render a decision between
the all-or-nothing rules of absolute affirmative defenses and the damages
apportionment rules of comparative fault, it must then decide whether to
treat this issue as a global one, or whether instead to divide damages in
some types of cases while applying all-or-nothing rules in others. The new
Restatement has adopted the former, global approach to comparative fault
(originally with one important exception), whereas many courts have
adopted some form of the latter, selective approach to damages division.
That is, many courts applying comparative fault to products liability cases
have retained one or more of the total-bar or total-recovery rules. Thus,
even under a general comparative fault scheme, many courts continue to
allow consumers to recover all of their damages if their only fault lies in
failing to discover a product defect. A number of courts also allow a
plaintiff to recover all of his damages if his negligence in encountering a
danger-sticking his hand in the operating area of a punch press-is the
very risk that the manufacturer could and should have designed out of the
product in the first place. And some courts refuse to reduce the damages
suffered by a drunk driver that are attributable to a defective seat belt.
Many courts also continue to apply all-or-nothing rules the other way,
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against the plaintiff, if he knowingly and unreasonably exposes himself to
a product risk, as in the hand-in-the-power-mower example.68
Section 7 of the new Restatement throws all forms of consumer
misconduct into the comparative responsibility damages-division hopper on
grounds of the inefficiency and impracticality of defining the borders of the
all-or-nothing categories and the difficulty of applying such rules in cases
involving third parties.6 ' Efficiency and practicality probably do suggest
such a compromise approach, but the law is based as well on principles of
fairness and corrective justice.7" Whether manufacturers and ultimately
other consumers should be "taxed" for the injuries suffered by a person who
cuts his hand while clearing away clumps of grass from beneath his mower,
or whether such a person instead should be required to insure himself
against this kind of risk at his own expense, is an issue that many courts
may choose to continue to resolve as an all-or-nothing issue based on
principle rather than practicality. At the other side of the issue, when a
person chomps down on a candy bar in a darkened movie theater only to
encounter a mouthful of squiggling worms and eggs embedded in
webbing,7 many courts may decide to continue to rule that principle
rather than expediency should dictate a rule of full recovery.
The one exception to section 7's general rule of comparative fault in
Tentative Draft No. 1 concerned the crashworthiness issue, addressed in
section 6. In arguing that a driver in such cases should be entitled to the
full recovery of all his damages, undiminished by some amount reflecting
his fault in causing the accident, comment f to section 6 reasoned that "if
the risks created by plaintiffs conduct are within the range that justifies
crashworthiness protection, plaintiffs conduct creates the very situation in
which the plaintiff has a legitimate right to expect the automobile to provide
reasonable protection. This is so regardless of the nature of the plaintiffs
conduct."72 This argument makes some sense for a rule of undiminished
recovery in crashworthiness cases, but it is virtually the same argument the
Restatement rejects as a general principle in comment d to section 7.
There, the comment notes that some
68. The doctrinal source for this defense lies in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A cmt. n (1964), which provides in pertinent part: "If the user or consumer discovers
the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use
of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery." The philosophic source for
the rule lies in the ethic of equality. Moral Foundations, supra note 19, at 476.
69. See Tentative Draft, supra note 1, § 7 cmt. d, at 146.
70. See generally Moral Foundations, supra note 19.
71. The inspiration for this delightfully repulsive scenario is Kassouf v. Lee Bros.,
Inc.; 26 Cal. Rptr. 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962). A more modem but less colorful example is
Coulter v. American Bakeries Co., 530 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (recovery for
biting into metal wire in doughnut should not be diminished on account of plaintiffs
peculiar manner of consumption).
72. Tentative Draft, supra note I, § 6 cmt. f, at 121.
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decisions hold that apportionment of liability is inappropriate where the
product lacked a safety feature that would protect against the risk that
resulted in the injury in question. The premise is that liability should not
be diminished when the plaintiff engages in the very conduct that the
product design should have prevented. 3
Why crashworthiness cases should be excluded from the general
damages apportionment rule of comparative fault is difficult to fathom. The
principle of full recovery for a manufacturer's failure to design into its
products protection for users against their own carelessness would appear to
stand or fall regardless of the category of case. Moreover, isolating
crashworthiness cases for special treatment in section 6 conflicts quite
starkly with section 7's thesis that "plaintiff fault should not be separated
into discrete categories."' Fortunately, in response to considerable
criticism of comment f, and based upon a well-briefed motion by a member
of the ALI,75 the Reporters withdrew most of their support for the version
of comment f to section 6 in Tentative Draft No. 1, and the ALl voted to
reject this aberration from the global rule of comparative fault.
The trend over the last three decades toward a general rule of
comparative fault applied broadly to accident cases has much to commend
it in terms of common sense and practicality. It minimizes difficult line
drawing between legal categories and the need for routine judicial review of
this especially fact-sensitive issue on the particular facts of particular cases.
Nevertheless, the mellowing of accident law in this respect involves some
quite pronounced sacrifices of principle in the law and throws important
problems of responsibility to juries without oar or rudder. Whether the
"law" of products liability should join league in this respect with the
compromising trend of accident "law" in general, by admitting an inability
to craft fair and workable all-or-nothing rules for particular categories of
problems, is a move that most courts should be reluctant to make without
careful deliberation.7 6 Although the Restatement may have extended the
doctrine of comparative fault in section 7 further than have most courts, its
move in this direction most certainly reflects the general graying of
products liability law on claimant fault.
73. Tentative Draft, supra note 1, § 7 cmt. d, at 146.
74. Id. at 147.
75. Hildy Bowbeer of Minneapolis.
76. The following admonition might be on point:
The principle of comparative fault apportionment of damages is veritably sweeping the
land, gobbling up much traditional tort doctrine as it goes. Courts need to be cautious
not to become caught up by the sheer momentum of the movement, and with the facile
simplicity of the doctrine, but instead should apply deliberate thought to each new call
for its further extension.
W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 479 (5th ed. 1984).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Products liability law has mellowed. At its conception in 1964 in
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the concept of "strict"
liability for the sale of "defective" products was conceived of as a unitary
and global concept that reflected the triumph of consumer freedom over
oppressive exploitation by manufacturers. As products liability law
explored its limits in the years that followed, it experimented with various
extremes, most of which proved in time to be too far one way or the other,
too expansive or too restrictive. During this time of maturation, the law of
defectiveness mellowed, at both its center and its borders, as courts and
commentators began to appreciate the complexities and nuances of the
competing values in this burgeoning area of the law. The defenses based
on user misconduct mellowed also as they participated in the onward march
of accident law's general principles of damages apportionment based upon
comparative fault. So now stands the law of modem products liability as
it quite faithfully is captured in the new Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability.
Products liability law has grayed. Its exuberance of adolescence now
a faint remembrance of the past, products liability law in recent years has
increasingly shunned black-and-white solutions for those of gray. It has
attempted compromise instead of confrontation, sought out middle ground
instead of borderland extremes, and chosen practicality, convenience, and
efficiency over principles of right and wrong." One might well argue that
these developments are the inherent design characteristics of middle age,
inevitable conditions of a mature system of legal principles serving equally
the aggregate best interests of the various constituencies governed by the
law. Surely the wheels of justice now turn more easily, worn down by age
and lubricated by practicality and convenience. But a certain melancholic
shadow drapes across the picture of these now fast-whirring wheels, as the
glimpses of justice at the center fade ever dimmer in the blur.
77. For a critical early look at such developments in tort law generally, see James A.
Henderson Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND.
L.J. 467 (1976).
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